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✡  Preparations                                                                  Ambiguous wording    25

            also suited imperialistic Britain’s prag-  ‘To Weizmann, the provisos emasculated the
            matic style of negotiation.
               Weizmann and the other Zionist    text and made him wonder if he should not
            leaders were dismayed by Milner’s new
            version, but felt that it would be danger-  have stood out for something stronger.’
            ous to hold out for the original wording
            and so delay the publication any longer
            than necessary.                   mediately saw the weakness of the   history’ – whether a more intransigent
               Before the Cabinet meeting on 4   wording: “We on our part examined and   stand on their part would have resulted
            October, Milner’s draft was yet again   re-examined the formula, comparing   in a better statement. 8
            altered with the aid of Amery to include   the old text with the new. We saw the
            a further phrase, this time to appease   differences only too clearly.” 7  1  This paper is based on a book by the author
            Arab concerns: “it being clearly under-  A comparison of the texts ‘shows a   entitled ‘The Ambiguity of the Balfour Declara-
            stood that nothing shall be done which   painful recession from what the Gov-  tion: Who caused it and Why?’ 2013
                                                                                  The Future of Palestine: January 1915, HLRO,
                                                                                2
            may prejudice the civil and religious   ernment itself was originally prepared   Samuel Papers, Break up of Ottoman Empire
            rights of existing non-Jewish communi-  to offer’, wrote Weizmann. Apart from   (Palestine) file, DR588.25, p. 144.
            ties in Palestine.”               the confusing ambiguity over what ‘a   3  War Cabinet Papers CAB 24/24/4 (GT1803)
               These two pledges of the Declara-  National Home’ meant, the final text   Sept. 3rd 1917 & CAB/24/4 (no. 245) Oct. 17th
            tion, the first to the Jews, the second to   introduced the notion of ‘civic and reli-  1917 [National Archives]
                                                                                  Edwin Montagu, The Anti-Semitism of the
            the Arabs were swiftly judged by the   gious rights of the existing non-Jewish   4 Present Government, August 23, 1917, National
            Foreign Office to be incompatible, but   communities’. This could ‘be interpreted   Archive, War Cabinet paper 24/24
            nonetheless remained in the Declara-  to mean such limitations on our work as   5  Lloyd George, D., War Memoirs of David
            tion. By the time this final draft was   completely to cripple it’.  Lloyd George 1933-36, London: Oldhams
                                                                                  Leopold Amery, My Political Life, Vol. 11,
            accepted by Cabinet, Weizmann and    To Weizmann, the provisos emas-  6 1953, p. 116-17, London: Hutchinson
            the drafting group were realising how   culated the text and were a ‘bitter pill   7  Weizmann, Trial and Error: the autobiography
            far it had morphed from the original   to swallow’. It made him wonder years   of Chaim Weizman, London: East and West
            wording and how their deliberate am-  later if he should not have stood out   Library, 1950, p. 261
                                                                                  Weizmann, Trial and Error: the autobiography
            biguity had backfired.            for  something  stronger,  and  in  his   8 of Chaim Weizman, London: East and West
               Weizmann and Ahad Ha’am im-    memoirs he calls it ‘one of the ifs of   Library, 1950, p. 207
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